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Papa Abel Remembers — The Tale of A Band of 
Booksellers, Fasicle 15: Competition!
by Richard Abel  (Aged Independent Learner)  <reabel@q.com>
We Argonauts had become hardened by and adroit at dealing with com-petition by the late 1960s.  We had 
afterall put out there in the open marketplace 
of ideas our Approval Plan, with the complete 
specifications for the ways to effectively reduce 
the cost of getting books responsive to the dif-
fering collecting interests of scholarly/research 
libraries and getting them into these libraries 
upon publication to better serve the needs of 
their users.  We had integrated the differing 
decisions respecting the need for receiving/not 
receiving books in all classes of series into the 
Approval Plan (books bearing some sort of 
series identification represented roughly 40% 
of all scholarly books published).
We had created a nearly worldwide system 
for the provision of virtually all the scholarly 
books published in the then scholarly languag-
es of the world to academic/research libraries 
in most of the then major teaching/research 
nations of the world.  (It might be said that we 
were at the leading edge of what is now styled 
“globalization.”)  This integrated acquisition 
system permitted us to provide libraries with 
books well beyond those published in their 
particular countries, extending their collecting 
scope to those published in other countries.
The bibliographic information relating to 
and identifying this vast array of book writ-
ings in a variety of languages was all read-
ily available in the massive computer files 
growing out of the Approval Plan.  We had 
developed a computer-based cataloging system 
incorporating not only Library of Congress 
cataloging records but also those generated by 
the firm for libraries unwilling to wait for the 
arrival of L.C. cataloging, and cataloging for 
the backlist titles derived from the supply of 
both turn-key undergraduate collections and 
turn-key opening-day collections for newly 
established libraries.  This extensive and grow-
ing cataloging database was all in our computer 
and readily available as card set, microfiche, 
and/or computer tape outputs.
We had developed first the bibliographies 
for both classes of turnkey libraries (under-
graduate and opening day collections) and 
then a sophisticated computer-based system 
for selecting books for both the latter de novo 
species of libraries and then for generating the 
orders to fulfill the book requirements, and 
finally to provide them fully-cataloged and 
processed with the requisite property indica-
tors, circulation pockets/cards, shelf labels, 
etc., for shelf-ready use.  All of these flexible, 
“mix & match” services were, as noted above, 
readily and fully-knowable in the public square 
of ideas.
In putting all this large body of interrelated 
ideas out into the public square we well under-
stood that imitators would quickly latch onto 
them and fashion various replicas of them. 
We also believed, a belief later confirmed in 
fact, that they would do so in a cheapened, 
watered-down fashion, as none seemed to 
be as driven by the imperative of advancing 
scholarly knowledge as were we — all of us 
bookmen.  We also understood from our years 
in the scholarly book trade that the first line of 
attack of competitors touting their Approval 
Plans and other copies of our systems would 
be price, just as it had been for all the earlier 
years of our experience.  They were not fun-
damentally committed to full service, which 
had governed our firm’s policies and practices 
from its inception.  Such a marketing strategy 
mounted by competitors manifestly entailed a 
cheapening of the quality and extent of service 
being offered.  So, we were well-prepared to 
deal progressively with what we were con-
vinced would be the shape of the private sector 
competitive environment in which we lived.
But suddenly out of the blue a quite 
unexpected competitor appeared.  The 
very nature of this new competitor was 
highly problematic.  It was a creature 
far different than anything with 
which we had coped 
for years.  It was cre-
ated out of munificent 
financial support from 
its opening and sup-
ported by continuing 
subventions along the 
way.  It was obliged 
to incur few of the 
costs for space, sup-
port utilities, taxes, or 
the enormous financial 
commitments to computer hardware attending 
the private sector.  It was given all manner 
of software that merely required integration, 
not the staggering costs of designing, pro-
gramming, and debugging the programs then 
required by the hardware available.  Quite why 
it ever came into being escaped our understand-
ing.  How to deal with it while still maintaining 
the vitality and financial well-being of our firm 
and our staff was equally beyond immediate 
reckoning.
As described earlier, and as feared in try-
ing to decipher the meaning of the behavior 
of the Federal contingent and the single ARL 
Librarian, all three of whom refused to take 
a seat at that meeting but remained fixed at 
the door in that riotous 1967 lunch meeting 
we had mounted for the ARL Librarians at 
an ALA meeting in Washington, some other 
still undisclosed initiative was in the wings. 
We had planned that meeting as a solicitation 
to participate in a program aimed at making 
cataloging for overseas books available much 
more quickly, little expecting neither the out-
burst of criticism aimed at the L.C. contingent 
nor their refusal to overtly join the meeting.  We 
learned soon enough that the recently-formed 
Council for Library Resources would fund 
this unheralded move in large measure.  The 
Ford Foundation, which funded the CLR, 
had declared its interest in providing a model 
for libraries to guide future development of a 
computer-based system for libraries.  The first 
initiative in 1966 involved a large grant to MIT 
for the development of such a model system. 
That effort proved largely fruitless — only a 
few working modules were developed.  In due 
course we next learned that a new corporate 
entity was to be launched and to be known by 
its initials-based acronym, OCLC.  OCLC 
then developed and was housed in space pro-
vided by Ohio State University Library and 
was to use a mainframe computer provided 
by OSU Library.  The initial purpose of this 
new not-for-profit was conceived to be the 
central, national online cataloging center. 
Participating library demand quickly diverted 
from this objective to that of conform-
ing to practicing library needs for the 
supply of L.C. catalog card sets as well 
as “shared cataloging” card sets. 
The organization started with 
the generous funding of 
CLR plus membership 
dues. OCLC contin-
ued to receive subven-
tions from a variety 
of sources as well as 
revenues from sales 
of card sets.  Several 
library-developed soft-
ware programs were 
donated. So, the “new 
kid on the block” was 
not only well and continuously funded and 
enjoyed two streams of steady income but 
also benefited from free or very inexpensive 
facilities and operational support.
Not long after learning of the nature of this 
new and novel creature, several librarians who 
had been acquiring cataloging from us shifted 
their catalog purchases to the “new kid.”  A 
couple of them, following our inquiries, advised 
sotto voce that they believed they must deal 
with OCLC out of a loyalty to their profession. 
It was a belief akin to loyalty for mom and 
apple pie.  How respond to such a response? 
We were baffled and forced to admit that emo-
tion had trumped reason.
 The nature of the new competitor was be-
coming increasingly clear and presented a quite 
different and grave threat not simply on the 
grounds of cost of operation but of emotional 
appeal.  We Argonauts now faced a competitive 
threat for which we had no answers arising out 
of past experience with competition.
Our firm had a fully-operational facility in 
the market-place for cataloging up and run-
ning at a competitive price. We were actually 
doing everything OCLC claimed to be doing. 
We were supporting the catalogs, using both 
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L.C. and Dewey call numbers of libraries not 
just in North America but also in Europe and 
the Antipodes.  Why, we wondered, this du-
plication of systems expensive to develop and 
then to operate, as was the training of skilled 
staff?  Why the investment in developing a 
market costly to develop?  Dealing with what 
we conceived as an unnecessary duplication 
of services readily and as cheaply available, 
coupled with its guaranteed financial and op-
erational support, led to the making of a kind 
a creature with which we had no experience, 
nor could we develop a thesis respecting how 
we might deal with it.
Finally, reluctantly cognizant of our empty 
intellectual kit bag, we turned to the remaining 
option of trying to explore with them com-
mon grounds on which our firm might work 
cooperatively with OCLC.  We tried to open 
the door to an exchange of ideas, only to have 
our overture rejected. In the next few months 
we tried on two further occasions to seek a 
meeting.  All three of our overtures were cast 
off out-of-hand.  The sense informing these 
refusals rather reminded me of the sense of 
the unofficial title used within the group of 
several of the university presses prior to the 
formation of the American Association of 
University Presses: “The Pure Tobacco Grow-
ers Association.”
So, the only avenue remaining open to 
us was to simply soldier on.  This course 
demanded that we view the investment in our 
system, the costs related to building the sup-
porting database, and the long-term welfare of 
a first-rate staff as of markedly reduced value 
— in short a substantial loss of corporate value 
and the worth of commitments to staff.  But 
that was the way a substantial gamble had to 
be viewed and so substantially depreciated. 
So, we had to live with the long-term loss 
and proceed with the implementation of other 
developmental plans.
While the move to our new, now-completed 
Portland quarters in 1970 was very disruptive 
for a period of several weeks, thanks to the 
excellent planning of the staff we were soon 
back up in full operation.  Having the entire 
operation in a single facility made for a much 
smoother and cohesive way of conducting the 
business.  Staff morale was visibly improved, 
thanks to the far better working conditions. 
This was the first purpose-designed, new 
setting in which to conduct the operations 
— a great improvement over the make-shift 
arrangements cobbled together in run-down, 
cheap quarters, which had marked our history 
until then.
The firm had for some months been grow-
ing quite rapidly, particularly in the area of 
overseas business — both in terms of number 
of libraries served and in purchases from 
overseas publishers, as increasing numbers 
of these libraries had turned to us to supply 
books from world-wide sources.  Max Gnehm, 
together with the managers of our overseas 
offices, had succeeded in markedly improving 
the conduct of our overseas operations.  This 
significant growth volume, and particularly that 
of the overseas offices, generated the need for 
additional financial muscle.  Keith Barker’s 
projections of future capital needs forcibly re-
turned management focus to matters financial. 
It was now clear that we would be compelled to 
take the company public whatever reluctance 
might be felt about assuming the burdens, 
financial and managerial, that such a move 
brought in its train.
We were now approaching the size that 
major investment banks minimally demanded. 
We selected one of the leading Wall Street 
firms as the one we wished to provide advice, 
underwrite the public offering, and provide an 
after-market for the stock.  Following Keith’s 
inquiry the bank agreed to accept us as a cli-
ent.  After some months of investigation by 
the bank’s underwriting staff, they supplied 
a comprehensive plan for the financial way 
forward.  All of this took the best part of a year. 
They lined up a couple of additional funding 
sources to provide added bridging financing 
until the firm had reached sales of a volume 
to support a share offering at $10 per share. 
We estimated that we could reach that objec-
tive in 1974, which would permit making the 
offering in 1975.  The plan also advised that 
the firm maximize the amount of debt it would 
take on.  This plan formed the basis for further 
negotiation which, when concluded, was to 
lead to the signing of an agreement with the 
investment bank and the bridging of financing 
institutions and the issuance of convertible 
bonds to be redeemed by the proceeds from 
the share offering.
I went to New York to complete the signing, 
which was completed on a Friday.  On the flight 
back to Portland I was, needless to say, much 
preoccupied with what had been done that 
day.  As I contemplated the repeatedly-proven 
historical maxim that things frequently do not 
work out the way in which they have been 
planned, I became very concerned that things 
might go wrong but that no provision had been 
made for such a contingency.  So, on Saturday 
I called the broker with whom we were work-
ing and shared my concerns.  He suggested 
we meet the New York officer handling the 
transaction on the following Monday.  So, I 
flew back on Sunday and went into the bank’s 
office on Monday.  I again voiced my concerns, 
at which the New York officer stood up, pulled 
down his vest and announced, “Our firm never 
lets down a client.”  With that the meeting 
ended, and I returned to Portland.
(The reader may well be wondering why 
this detailed, and perhaps boring, exposition of 
such arcane matters as corporate financial plan-
ning rather than matters relating more directly 
to library interests.  This exercise has been un-
dertaken simply because this protracted event 
consumed much management time for the best 
part of a year and, more importantly, this plan 
set the firm’s management course for the next 
several years and established stringent limits 
on our financial options henceforward.)
So, confident in the requisite financial 
backing, off we went to support the continu-
ing momentum of sales and the continued 
forward thrust of services aimed at further as-
sisting libraries in serving their users in more 
cost-effective ways.  On the collection supply 
side we began to offer increasing amounts of 
so-called “gray literature” on the Approval 
Plan.  This initiative was taken on the twin 
observations that research libraries were in-
creasingly ordering such fleeting and obscure 
material from us and that as the sheer volume 
of research findings ballooned-up (witnessed 
by the related multiplication of the number of 
journal pages required to carry the burgeoning 
research results being produced), increasing 
numbers of significant research results were 
being published neither as books nor as journal 
articles but as stand-alone, “gray” publications. 
This form of disseminating research results 
arose from the fact that such reports were too 
brief for books and too lengthy for journal 
articles.  Further, increasing numbers of such 
publications were proprietary publications 
often bearing substantial prices and so simply 
not generally available through any of the more 
typical channels of dissemination.
On the cataloging side we put substantial re-
sources to bear on the cataloging infrastructure 
of authority files, which were no longer being 
given the support needed to keep collections 
coherent.  We also well understood that we 
had to turn to developing online capabilities, 
moving away from punched card input and 
access.  Given the sheer intractability of the 
then main-frame computers, this was not a 
negligible undertaking.
Internally and driven by increasing vol-
umes we had to both bring more of the book 
and library expertise out in the branch offices 
in-house and put them in charge of the various 
operating departments supporting the services 
we were offering or planned to offer.  This 
requirement entailed in turn stepping up the 
search for and training of prospective branch 
managers.  We also transferred substantial 
amounts of the book “profiling” for the some 
95,000 titles now passing through the Approval 
Plan to other locations.  Thus, “profiling” the 
books from the United Kingdom and conti-
nental Europe was transferred to the London 
office, now under the supervision of Tom 
Slatner.  A very substantial fraction of the 
“profiling” of books published in the United 
States was transferred to the New Jersey of-
fice under Tom Martin’s supervision.  These 
moves compelled the locating and training of 
other “profilers” — not an easy task.  And, of 
course, we simply needed more staff, and that 
matching the intelligence and dedication of 
present staff to support the volume of books 
moving through, many of which required the 
addition of other components from our “mix-
and-match” offerings.
In short, management attention and time 
had to be much more focused on recruitment 
and training of good book people.  We had 
resolved our long-fraught financial riddle but 
now needed to deal with staff matters.  We 
thought we were making great progress in 
the staffing aspect of the development of the 
firm — a confidence which was to be shaken 
shortly.  
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